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Introduction 
On the 5th of December 2014 the government published a Consultation Paper seeking views on 
how best to introduce a mandatory reporting requirement in cases of female genital mutilation 
(FGM). The consultation period remained open until January 12th with submissions now under 
review. In this post I share some thoughts on the recommendations proposed and revisit some 
of the key debates and scholarship critiquing the challenge, and complexity, of culture for 
gender equality. Debates about culture whether through voice, symbol or practice are never 
clear cut. They are always complex, always nuanced and, more often than not, divisive. That 
complexity is most apparent in the context of FGM and was most apparent in last week’s trial, 
where a doctor was found not guilty of FGM.  
As readers will be aware FGM involves removing or ‘cutting’ all or part of a girl or women’s 
external genital organs including the area around her vagina and her clitoris. There are no health 
benefits to this practice. Depending on the perspective of the practicing community or group, 
FGM is a cultural, religious, health, sexual, aesthetic or moral practice. FGM takes place to 
mark the traditional rite of passage from girlhood to womanhood, to help marry a girl off, to 
ensure virginity and modesty or to prevent genital disease. The negative consequences of the 
practice are well known. It is a practice that often leaves girls and women physically and 
mentally scarred for life. On a global scale, the World Health Organisation estimate that more 
than 125 million girls and women alive today have been cut. The practice is most prevalent in 
Africa and the Middle East.  
From an England and Wales perspective, it has recently been reported by the Health and Social 
Care Information Centre that there were 1,279 active cases and 467 newly identified cases of 
FGM in September 2014. More broadly, Equality Now and City University estimate that 
approximately 10,000 girls aged under 15, who have migrated to England and Wales, are likely 
to have undergone FGM and are living with the impact of FGM.  
This Consultation Paper can be seen as the next step in a series of reform and policy proposals 
designed to eliminate and prevent the practice of FGM in England and Wales. In July 2014, at 
the Girl Summit, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister made a commitment to end 
FGM. The government is unequivocal that FGM is a criminal offence and an extremely harmful 
form of child abuse.  
The Current Law on FGM 
FGM has been a criminal offence in England and Wales since 1985 under the Prohibition of 
Female Circumcision Act. However, a loophole in that Act allowed for the taking of girls who 
were settled in the UK abroad to have the practice of FGM carried out. The Female Genital 
Mutilation Act 2003 sought to close that loophole by providing for extra territorial effect 
(section 4) as recommended by an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development 
and Reproductive Health reporting in 2000. The 2003 Act also increased the maximum penalty 
on conviction, on indictment, from 5 to 14 years imprisonment (Section 5).  
Despite the amendment in 2003 it has remained extremely difficult to prosecute in this area. 
As in other jurisdictions the hidden nature of the crime and the fear of being judged as racist 
or being ostracised by one’s community has deterred individuals from reporting on the practice.  
The Recommendations/Proposals: 
In introducing the Consultation Paper Theresa May, on behalf of the government, stated that 
the mandatory reporting of FGM ‘will bring FGM out of the shadows and illustrate to 
perpetrators that they will be tracked down’ (p.3). The Consultation Paper was set out in three 
parts: Parts A, B and C.  
In Part A the government sought views on the scope of mandatory reporting. That is, whether 
the duty to report should apply to ‘known’, ‘suspected’ or ‘at risk’ cases. The government 
proposes that mandatory reporting should only cover ‘known’ cases of FGM. A known case is 
one that has been visually confirmed or disclosed to a professional by the victim. (para 2.6) 
The approach recommended is narrow. It differs from the approach taken in Norway, for 
example, where there is a duty to report on ‘suspected’ and ‘at risk’ cases as well as known 
cases. As identified in the Consultation Paper, ‘there are a number of risks with introducing a 
duty to report ‘suspected’ or ‘at risk’ cases. (para 2.4). It identified that it is extremely difficult 
to compile a definitive list of generic risk factors. Furthermore, introducing a mandatory 
reporting duty to report ‘suspected’ or ‘at risk’ cases could, it was argued, lead to a very wide 
interpretation of risk and as a corollary lead to certain communities being targeted. It could 
also lead to the system seeing a sharp increase in referrals and a disproportionate focus on FGM. 
Recent research, from Lien and Schultz (2014), on ‘the risky legal framework’ of mandatory 
reporting in Norway draws attention to the negative implications of a wider ‘duty to avert’ 
approach. By drawing on one Norwegian case, where a teacher suspected that FGM had been 
carried out on a Somalian girl in his class, they discuss the conflict that arises between the duty 
to avert FGM and the law against discrimination. In that particular case it was found that FGM 
had not taken place and that family relations were positive and harmonious. The father of the 
girl then filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for Discrimination arguing that the girl was 
examined purely because she was from Somali. The Ombudsman found in his favour. The child 
welfare service appealed the decision to the Discrimination and Equality Tribunal who found 
in their favour. Lien and Schultz conclude that the law in Norway ‘is questionable’ both in 
principle and practice (p.208). They call for a reduction on the pressure on employees to report 
and call for greater cultural and contextual knowledge on FGM to be given to care givers. 
(p.208).  
 
With regard to the reporting of ‘known’ cases in England and Wales, the government proposes 
that the reporting duty be applied to under 18s only (para 2.10) and on the question of who 
should report, the government proposes that the new duty is placed on healthcare professionals, 
teachers and children’s social care staff. (para 2.18) 
In Part B, the government addressed the issue of sanctions for failing to report. Two options 
were set out including an individual being placed on a ‘barred’ list (unable to work or volunteer 
with children or vulnerable people) by the Disclosure and Barring Service DBS (para 3.4) or a 
disciplinary sanction being imposed by the relevant professional body (para 3.6). Here, the 
government sought particular views on what sanctions and what level of sanction should be 
placed on individuals who fail to report.  
In considering the proposals put forward regarding sanctions and more generally the duty to 
report it could be argued that the measures being proposed are indicative of the government’s 
‘new’ approach to fighting crime involving a shift of power from Whitehall to local 
communities to fight crime. Undeniably a multi-agency and targeted approach is required in 
an area such as this but we, as a society, need to be cognisant of the potential negative impacts 
of this ‘big brother’ type approach. Is it reasonable to place this level of burden to report and 
potential sanction on healthcare professionals, teachers and social care staff? Will the 
introduction of mandatory reporting in this area lead to further division and further alienation 
and, indeed, the essentialisation of our immigrant population? Mandatory reporting, it is argued, 
could lead to a reluctance by individuals to use and avail of the key services they require for 
fear of the consequences that it may have on family life. 
Part C briefly addressed statutory guidelines. The position of the government is that statutory 
guidelines on FGM would be aimed at all persons who exercise public functions in relation to 
safeguarding. (para 4.3) 
The government hope to publish a report on the submissions received sometime in 2015. For 
updates see here. 
Some thoughts on the complexity of culture and gender equality… 
As someone who researches on culture and identity rights and advocates, on the whole, for the 
protection of one’s culture, FGM inevitably brings forth a challenge and raises questions as to 
how the right to culture can, in a real and meaningful way, be reconciled with the right to 
gender equality? More specifically how can Article 27 of the ICCPR (protecting minority 
rights), Article 15 of the ICESCR (recognising rights to cultural life) be compatible with Article 
5 of CEDAW? Article 5 of CEDAW provides that: 
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or 
on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
 In seeking to eliminate ‘prejudices and customary’ practices we are reminded of the work of 
the late Susan Okin who asked the provocative question ‘is multiculturalism bad for women?’ 
in 1999. She did so in the context of the consideration of practices such as FGM. Okin 
concluded that it was – bad for women, that is. In her view women: 
 ‘…might be much better off if the culture into which they were born were either to 
become extinct (so as its members would become integrated into the less sexist 
surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce 
the equality of women.’ (1999:22/23) 
For Okin, the multiculturalist project of protecting the rights of minority groups, often imposing 
‘dangerous’ patriarchal rights, undoes the results of the feminist struggle for gender equality. I 
admire Okin’s work and too recognise, as with most of western society it seems, that FGM is 
a form of violence against women and girls and it does reflect a deep-rooted inequality between 
the sexes. It constitutes an extreme form of discrimination against women. The practice violates 
a woman’s right to health, security and physical integrity, the right to be free from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to life when the procedure results in death. 
When FGM is carried out on young girls it is a violation of the rights of children. 
But then I ask, who am I to judge? By agreeing with Okin am I failing to challenge the false 
universality of so called western feminist liberalism? To agree with Okin, as noted by Siobhan 
Mullally further entrenches a “them and us”; the liberal and the so called illiberal. (Mullally, 
2010:1)  And though this point has been made elsewhere, we must not lose sight of the 
‘increasing commodification of the female body and the easy availability of cosmetic surgeries’ 
for the so called ‘liberated First world woman’ raising questions about the normative 
requirements of gender equality and the cultural context (Mullally, 2010: 2). Further still, Judge 
Tulkens, dissenting in Şahin v Turkey, reminds us that ‘equality and non-discrimination are 
subjective rights which must remain under the control of those who are entitled to benefit from 
them’(para 12).  
Within the Consultation Paper it stated that the government is interested to hear from victims 
of FGM and community groups and leaders. That invitation is to be welcomed but I do wonder 
why, if the government sought to have a ‘full’ discussion on this why the consultation process 
remained open for a mere 5 weeks (see p.5). Though I appreciate that a policy drive to eliminate 
FGM is well intended, I do hope that the required time will be taken to consider whether 
mandatory reporting is a suitable next step. In this context too it is hoped that discussions are 
raised about projects which have sought to provide alternatives to FGM within community 
groups; projects that could be supported an encouraged by the government. In Kenya, for 
example, NGOs have worked with communities to encourage an ‘alternative rite to passage’ 
or circumcision through words for young girls (p.41).  
We have, as noted by the brief discussion here, the opportunity to learn from elsewhere. Yes, 
cultural issues are complex. FGM is complex! The government needs to thread carefully and 
take the time that is required to develop a responsible and rational policy system and work with 
communities and not against them.  
